BCE taglia i tassi. Olocausto dei risparmi in arrivo

dal Blog di Pasquale Marinelli – Postato il 06/06/2014

Era prevedile e non ho mai perso l’occasione di dire che i banchieri centrali non sanno fare altro che svalutare il denaro in tasca ai cittadini.

La BCE taglia il tasso ufficiale di interesse da 0,25% a 0,15%.

Questo cosa significa?

Significa che per le banche commerciali il costo del denaro ricevuto in prestito dalla BCE costerà ancora meno (quasi regalato).

E in coerenza con la spiegazione data dal governatore, secondo cui il maggior incentivo dovrebbe stimolare le banche a riprendere la concessione del credito alle imprese,

si taglia anche il tasso di interesse sui depositi presso la stessa BCE, portandolo a valori negativi, ovvero a -0,10% (prima volta nella storia dell’euro).

Questo cosa significa?

Significa che per le banche, le quali hanno un conto corrente presso la banca centrale europea, i loro depositi saranno onerosi anziché remunerativi.

Esse lo riceveranno in prestito a buon mercato dalla BCE (allo 0,15% di interesse) e, anziché tenerlo depositato presso quest’ultima e pagarci su lo 0,10% di interesse,

lo investiranno, non in concessione di mutui, bensì in obbligazioni e titoli di stato.

In obbligazioni perché, per lo meno esse rendono tassi positivi (e non negativi come un deposito presso la BCE ) e costituiscono crediti privilegiati rispetto a ciò che rappresenta un mutuo concesso ad un cliente che sguazza nella triste realtà economica, in titoli di stato perché il governatore della BCE è sempre pronto a mitigare ogni pericolo di default dei debiti sovrani.

Quindi assisteremo ad un farlocco incremento degli indici di borsa (ovviamente !) e ad un indebolimento dell’euro rispetto al dollaro, ad un possibile incremento delle esportazioni europee.

Nell’economia reale invece, assisteremo ad una ripresa dell’inflazione e incremento del costo della vita, certamente a causa delle importazioni che diverranno più onerose e che determineranno un incremento dei costi di produzione, probabilmente anche a causa dell‘incremento del denaro in circolazione, emesso dalla BCE in occasione dell’operazione SMP ( NdR Securities Market Programme) , per cui ha annunciato che ne interromperà il piano di riassorbimento e che quindi rischieranno di tracimare nell’economia reale e di contribuire all’aumento dei prezzi.

La tragedia dell’euro che si sta consumando, oggi vede da un lato gli interessi di governi e banca centrale a stimolare maggiore spesa pubblica (e quindi maggiore debito pubblico per gli stati europei), dall’altro lato è in corso il più grande piano della storia di rientro del debito privato, a cui sono interessate tutte le banche commerciali d’Europa esposte nell’economia reale e quella finanziaria, le quali non hanno interesse a prestare denaro.

In mezzo a questi due interessi contrapposti vi è quello dei risparmiatori. Non gli interessi dei contribuenti tartassati; da essi non c’è quasi più nulla da spremere; i governi potranno tassare di più una categoria piuttosto che un’altra, ma disporre una maggiore pressione fiscale generalizzata sarebbe come ordinare di consegnare la proprietà dei privati direttamente allo Stato (chissà! meglio non pensarci per ora).

Oggi sono i risparmiatoriquelli nel mirino dell’aggressione da parte di banche e governi.

I risparmiatori sono coloro che possono determinare gli investimenti sani per una ripresa economica sostenibile.

I risparmiatori sono coloro che negli anni hanno assunto un comportamento virtuoso risparmiando parte dei loro redditi per destinarli agli investimenti.

Sono questi coloro che pagheranno il rientro del debito privato voluto dalle banche, l’aggressione dei loro risparmi consentirà alle banche di coprire i buchi nei loro bilanci, ai governi di continuare ad indebitare i cittadini e a concentrare i capitali in mano a pochi.

Sembra tutto già deciso.

  by  Frances  Coppola ,  6/04/2014

Why Negative Rates Won’t Work In The Eurozone

The ECB has imposed negative interest rates on funds placed on deposit with it by banks (“excess” reserves).

The ECB’s deposit rate has been zero for a long time, and the possibility of the ECB imposing negative rates on reserves has been discussed for nearly as long.

I first wrote about the likely effects of negative rates on reserves back in December 2012.

My conclusion was this:

But consider what would happen if an economy experiencing deflationary pressure introduced negative interest rates. The squeeze on the margins of already-damaged banks would inevitably lead to higher rates to borrowers and reduced lending volumes. This is monetary tightening, not easing, and the effect would be contractionary. It would make the recession worse.

Negative interest rates are a tax on bank reserves. They are therefore intrinsically contractionary.

The argument is that banks will try to get rid of reserves rather than pay the tax, so will have an incentive to lend more.

But the evidence seems to suggest the opposite.

This chart shows deposit and lending volumes in Danish banks before and after the introduction of negative rates on reserves (h/t Roberto Mulazzi):

 

Oh dear. It seems there was deposit flight – not surprisingly, since although Danish banks didn’t pass the negative rates on to savers directly, they would have found ways of discouraging them. And lending volumes, already falling at the time negative rates were imposed, continued to fall.

It seems unlikely that the ECB is unaware of the effect of negative rates on Danish lending volumes. So despite extensive comments in the media about negative rates encouraging banks to lend, I doubt if that is the real purpose.

Indeed, as M3 lending figures for the Eurozone actually improved slightly in April, it is hard to see why the ECB would act now when it did not earlier this year.

So I don’t think this is about bank lending at all. I think it is about German disinflation and the exchange value of the Euro.

German CPI (NdR consumer price index ) inflation is currently 0.9%, far below the ECB’s target of “close to” 2%, and trending downwards. It’s unclear exactly why this is, but one possibility is the strong Euro. Because of Germany’s export dependence, a strong Euro puts downwards pressure on German inflation – indeed this is why historically the Bundesbank, ever the inflation hawk, has preferred a strong currency.

As Germany is very dominant in the Eurozone, German disinflation feeds through into low Eurozone inflation.

Denmark’s principal aim in imposing negative rates was to preserve its currency peg to the Euro. The krone was appreciating at the time due to hot money inflows from the troubled Euro area. Negative rates dampened the outflows and depressed the value of the krone, enabling Denmark to hold its currency peg.

The effect can be seen clearly on this chart:

So if the principal objective of the ECB is to bring down the exchange value of the Euro, the Danish experience suggests that negative rates might indeed work.

The question is whether this is really the most important driver of Eurozone disinflation.

The principal cause of Eurozone disinflation appears to be falling energy costs. Energy is priced in US dollars, so bringing down the value of the Euro in relation to the dollar should arrest the fall in energy costs. But it is not clear why stopping the fall in energy costs is helpful: after all, lower energy prices are a help to hard-pressed businesses and overstretched households.

It’s hard to see why the ECB should act to prevent benign disinflation of this kind.

Nor is it obvious that supporting exports by weakening the Euro is either necessary or wise. The Eurozone already has an export surplus due to the fact that the enormous German surplus is no longer fully offset by trade deficits in periphery countries. As demand has collapsed in the periphery and businesses have been forced to look for exports, imports in these countries have fallen and exports have risen.

Weakening the Euro would be likely to help German exporters and increase the German surplus still more:

the EC Commission this week warned about “macroeconomic imbalances” in the German economy, by which it meant the trade surplus, which is associated with low domestic demand, poor domestic investment and a generally uninspiring growth record. The ECB encouraging this surplus to grow still more is hardly prudent.

To be sure, Japan and China are currently weakening their currencies by means of expansive monetary policy, thereby exporting deflation to the rest of the world.

Inflation is falling everywhere, and particularly in the Eurozone where the ECB’s tight monetary stance has left the Euro vulnerable. What we have is currency wars – and as I have pointed out before in relation to the US and China, trade wars fought out in the currency and bond markets don’t tend to end well.

Competitive devaluation of the Euro really is not a great strategy.

And this makes me question again what the point of negative rates would be. Apart, that is, from maintaining the ECB’s credibility. It has talked for far too long: now markets are demanding action. It has to be seen to do something. This is something.

I fear this is yet another can-kicking exercise by a central bank that has left it far too late for effective action and is so politically circumscribed that there is little it can do anyway.

*The first paragraph has been amended in the light of the ECB’s announcement of cuts in all its rates. Refi rate is now 0.15%, marginal lending rate 0.4%, deposit rate -0.1%.

The great experiment has begun.